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ble, is indifferent. Just like zeros and ones are in-
different.3
I do not refer to this abstract theoretical con-
cept of ’anti-humanism‘ , but to a more concrete
from of humanism – that makes no abstractions
from the ”richness of meaningful human activites“
– very much in line with Scott Lash. Humanism
thrives where there are no sharp dualisms. The
dualism of people and machines excludes huma-
nism in a meaningful sense. Alberti and Vitruvius
were humanists. Descartes and Hobbes were not,
already dealing in the logic of abstraction, he
writes. Organic images for the human society were
developed by the Greeks. They conceived the citi-
zen, the city, and the cosmos to be built according
to the same principles. To see the structure of hu-
man groups as a mirror of natural forms has remai-
ned imaginatively and intellectually powerful.4 Re-
naissance architects drew on these organic images.
We are all familiar with their images. But major
changes in science and technology have occurred.
In his Introduction to Kas Oosterhuis’ book Pro-
grammable Architecture, Ole Bouman writes that
today we experience the next step of dissolution
of social bodies.5 Families, firms, communities are
either vanishing or changing their structure. After
the melting into air of ideologies and big moral
institutions, it is now the turn of patterns of de-
pendency and interaction between people to be
liquefied. They have become malleable, Bouman
writes. Oosterhuis’ architecture to him is the art of
no longer occupying space by its enclosure, but
the creation of situations that become movable
and thus reflecting these social tendencies. It is
difficult to represent values when there are no lon-
ger any shared values, he writes. Architecture is at
risk of losing its cultural relevance. Unless it is able
to redefine itself in Hyperarchitecture of moving
surfaces as in Oosterhuis’ Trans-ports Version with
a rubber exterior, or in interactive surfaces to over-
come the supposed passivity of the viewer.
Of course no form of humanism is present in
this information culture, in which the machinic
and the digital become predominant and human
beings become increasingly attached to their infor-
mation machines and display screens. Although it
leaves many questions to be solved, Ole Bouman’s
critique still operates on a notion of relative auto-
nomy, a relation with society is still present. But
why this kind of architecture should be mimicking
society without any form of resistance, is not clear.
It seems more like a perfect fit into the experience
industries. The architects themselves operate on a
completely autonomous level. For Lynn the preva-
lence of topological surfaces presents the first op-
portunity for architects to draw and sketch using
calculus. The challenge for Lynn is to try to under-
stand the appearance of these tools in a more so-
phisticated way than as simply a new set of sha-
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Humanism is a complex concept. The way I use it
here is not in the theoretical way of ’anti-huma-
nism‘ in discourse or theory. Michael Hays in his
book on Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer
refers to this ’anti-humanism‘ in theory.1 The sub-
ject, Hays writes, is no longer viewed as an origi-
nating agent of meaning, but as a variable and dis-
persed entity whose very identity and place are
constituted in social practice. Objects and social
processes are seen as having a material existence
independent of, and at times threatening to, the
unity of the individual self. What Hays argues is
that an analogous perceptual shift, which he calls
posthumanism, can be detected within modern
architecture – in particular the architecture of
Meyer and Hilberseimer. It is a shift away from the
humanist concept of subjectivity to the so called
’death‘ of the subject that refers to the transfor-
mation of the romantic ideal of individuality to
’structurality‘ in e. g. Althusser or Foucault. It is
the notion that humans stand as triumphant sub-
jects among inert objects, a concept long gone.
With Deleuze and Guattari we can go one step
further. It means that the distinction of organic
and inorganic life has to be reformulated. If orga-
nic life cannot be easily demarcated from inorga-
nic matter as they claimed, it behoves subjects to
look at all matter from a different angle. Our expe-
rience of a shrinking globe writes Conley, inflects
the vision of the monad, – the name that Leibniz
ascribes to the soul –, since compressions of time
and space modify the difference of inside and out-
side, and of public and private. Leibniz monad is a
cell, a room with neither doors nor windows, a
crypt where all activity takes place on the inside.
The monad is about the autonomy of the inside, a
phenomenon that is as good as lost in our present
day world. Monadology in Leibniz turns into no-
madology in Deleuze, a way of emigrant thinking,
deterritorializing accepted notions of space and
received ideas. Theory has to be grasped in the
place and time out of which it emerges. These si-
tuations are constantly changing. This also works
for the position I will try to explain here; Greg
Lynn’s notion on ’folding‘ in his Animate Form.2
The same goes for the position I will argue from,
not so much circumscribed by post structuralism
or psycho-analysis but by social theories; discour-
ses that seek not only to make social life intelli-
gible but also to make it better. My argument will
be that with Greg Lynn’s experiments we are final-
ly loosing all ground. With Scott Lash I claim that
we need more ’ground‘ instead of ’folds‘. I think I
can agree with Lashs’ critique on Koolhaas, which
also works for Lynn: Speed supersedes space as in-
difference supersedes difference. The location of
most of Koolhaas’s constructions is nowhere, they
might be anywhere. The complexity of movement
in international airports, themselves interchangea-
pes, he writes.6 My impression is that we are not
dealing with another form of contemporary forma-
lism, nor with a new geometry in terms of style.
Although with Oosterhuis and van Berkel this is
also the case. Oosterhuis explicitly refers to the
design of cars, the Audi in particular.
The American biologist Donna Haraway has ar-
gued that biology has ceased to exist and that the
organism has been replaced by cybernetic systems,
which have radically changed the connections of
physical life, and the human sciences.7 Socio-bio-
logy, like all modern biology’s, studies not the hu-
man body, but a control machine as its central
object. ”Nature“, writes Haraway, is structured as
a series of ”interlocking cybernetic systems“, which
are theorized as communications problems. The
genetic calculus of socio-biology concerns maxi-
mization strategies of genes and combinations of
genes. The noumenal object here is ”the gene“,
called by Richard Dawkins the ”replicator“, within
the gene pool. Bodies and societies are only the
replicator’s strategies for maximizing their own re-
productive profit. There seems to be a certain cor-
respondence in the way Deleuze understands
Leibniz in his book on The Fold and the baroque.8
In Leibniz we are dealing with an infinity of mo-
nads which form the center of a compound sub-
stance, as he calls it (for example an animal). This
body is organic when it forms a kind of automaton
or natural machine, which is a machine not only as
a whole but also in its smallest observable parts.
Each monad is a kind of living mirror, or a mirror
endowed with internal action, it represents the
universe according to its point of view. Leibniz en-
visions three hierarchical levels of organic existen-
ce among ”aggregated substances“. An organism
as integrated aggregate, an animal as an organism
dominated by a soul and an intelligent creature; an
animal dominated by a spirit. Animals have con-
sciousness or feelings, intelligent creatures have
self-consciousness. Leibniz ’s philosophy is pan-or-
ganic writes Nicolas Rescher.9 In Leibniz all nature
is alive, every monad is a vital center of an organic
structure. Each organic body of a living being is a
kind of divine machine or natural automaton which
infinitely surpasses all artificial automata, Leibniz
writes. This is only true for living machines, not for
man made machines. A divine planning in nature
is common for some 17th century thinkers, God
was the great watchmaker, a machine maker. But
for Leibniz God was the great organism-maker, a
machine as an organic automaton with inherent
teleology. Every piece can be divided into further
pieces, each of which has some motion of its own.
Otherwise it would be impossible that each bit of
matter could express the whole universe, Leibniz
writes in Theodicy.10 Leibniz pan-organic view of
the world is predicated on the idea that life is
everywhere. The then-recent discovery of the
microscope and the finding that even a single drop
of water contains a whole variety of organisms,
was regarded by him as a striking illustration of
this position. The work of e.g. the Dutch scientists
Jan Swammerdam and Antoni van Leeuwenhoek
always interested him enormously.
Folding and unfolding in this sense are no lon-
ger simply means of contraction and dilation, but
evolution. The organism is defined by its ability to
fold its own parts and unfold them to a degree of
development that is characteristic of each species.
To unfold is to increase, to grow, just as the cater-
pillar will unfold into the butterfly. Here we might
find a link to contemporary socio-biology. Hara-
way rightfully criticizes the explicit agenda of con-
temporary socio-biology. Socio-biological reaso-
ning applied to the human societies easily glides
into facile naturalization of job segregation, domi-
nance hierarchies, racial chauvinism, and the ’ne-
cessity‘ of domination in sexually based societies
to control the nastier aspects of genetic competi-
tion. For a socio-biologist, dominance is not a trait,
nor even an individual organismic predisposition,
but a system property.11 The comparison between
the genetic or rule-based phenomenon of compu-
tation is not comparable with human intelligence
or nature. The computer is not a brain, Lynn wri-
tes, it’s ”intelligence“ makes ”mindless connec-
tions“, the failures of artificial intelligence suggest
a need to develop a systematic human intuition
about the connective medium, rather than at-
tempting to build critically into the machine. Hara-
way’s critique on socio-biology easily works for a
blind folding of computer generated forms. It even
works for Lynn’s vocabulary. Haraway distinguis-
hes the difference in vocabulary in pre-second
world war life sciences and post war socio-biology.
Before the second world war the bio-science of
organisms was dealing with notions of: psychobio-
logy, human engineering, organism, physiology,
intelligence and person. Post war theories are dea-
ling with: socio-biology, communication control,
cybernetic machines, systems theory, information
and genes. In other words the person with his/her
intelligence is replaced by genes and information
structures.
A similar critical notion we find in Virilio who is
of the opinion that when people invent the ”world
brain“ by declaring that humans are no longer hu-
man but ”neurons inside a world brain“, and that
interactivity factors this phenomenon, it is more
than just a question of the society of control – it’s
the cybernetic society. Taking the model of bees or
some other self-regulated system, is the very op-
posite of freedom and democracy, Virilio re-
marks.12 Architectural concepts and procedures
are never neutral, not in Renaissance architecture,
not in the Baroque and not in our present day
situation of blob architecture. 
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In that sense this kind of architecture ( whether
you call it blobs, folds, diagrams, un-volumetric or
programmable architecture) is not related to prac-
tical humanism since it deals with information sys-
tems, digital technologies, simulation and visuality.
The reason I am referring to sociobiology is that
the deities of the organic body as in Alberti are not
sacred to the new designers of evolutionary strate-
gies. Sociobiology, with all its dangers included,
has the advantage that it can cleanse its objects of
obsolescent flaws in natural design. One of the
things we could learn from Haraway is her insight
in the difference between natural and artificial,
one of the parameters of every contemporary de-
sign strategy. Late twentieth-century machines ha-
ve made thoroughly ambiguous the difference bet-
ween natural and artificial, mind and body, self-
developing and externally designed. Our machines
are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves are frigh-
teningly inert, says Haraway. The socio-biological
narratives depend on a high-tech view of the body
as a ”biotic component“ or ”cybernetic communi-
cations system“. What Hays has detected in Hil-
berseimer’s and Meyer’s modernism, the decente-
ring of the subject, is ironically if not cynically fully
present in today’s socio biology. 
It’s of course not the same, but in a certain way
Alberti’s narrative already shows some similarity.
Karsten Harries stresses the artificiality of Alberti’s
construction13.He quotes Hubert Damish who wri-
tes that Alberti reduces the viewing subject to a
kind of Cyclops that obliges the eye to remain at
one fixed, indivisible point. In other words, it obli-
ges to adopt a stance that has nothing in common
with the effective conditions of perception. In his
discussion on Folded Forms from Leibniz to Lynn
(Skin and Bones), in Warped Space, Anthony Vidler
shows us that Leibniz notions of the classical pictu-
re space have complicated this concept.14 Rather
than accepting the viewing subject as Cyclop, and
accepting the back surface of the camera as a
receiving surface, he has himself stretched a canvas
in the space, as a receptor of the images. This scre-
en Vidler explains, is not the flat picture plane of
classical representation; it is from the start ridged
and folded. The spatial setting of understanding is
thus a pinhole camera, only with more than one
opening for the transmitting of images from the
outside. Leibniz postulated a screen / canvas or
curtain in the darkened room to receive what he
called ’the species‘ (les especs, or being). This scre-
en or curtain is not uniform, but diversified by
folds (les plis) representing items of innate know-
ledge. Deleuze sketches a house with two floors.
The two levels are connected. It is the upper floor
that has no windows. ”Monads“ Leibniz writes,
have no windows through which something could
enter or leave. Its only furnishing is that of the
screen which represents a brain, a kind of mecha-
nically pulsating substance, quite different from
Alberti’s construction. Deleuze, writes Vidler, has
provided a lower story for this unlivable house
without windows, one with five openings to let
the five sense do their work, it operates as a kind
of bodily anteroom to the monadic soul. But here
too there is no stable ground for referentiality, no
coherent system of meaning or autonomous base.
The monad is a chamber of whispers, and expressi-
on occurs only at the synthesis of these whispers
into a chorus in which the monad itself might ap-
pear like a conductor, writes Gregg Lambert in his
book on Deleuze.15 The folds, cords or springs re-
present an innate form of knowledge, they move
into action by matter. The movements of the visi-
ble oscillate or vibrate from the matter below, it is
by a process of resonance in the monad that the
visible movements in matter become audible. What
is perceptible on one level becomes legible on the
other, from matter to soul. The monad or crypt
functions as echo chamber. Deleuze writes that it
is pointless to imagine modern situations unless
they can help us understand what the baroque had
entailed. Folds are in the soul and exist only in the
soul. Matter triggers ’vibrations or oscillations‘ at
the lower extremity of the cords, through the in-
termediary of ’some little openings‘ that exist on
the lower level. It is a great baroque montage, wri-
tes Deleuze, a montage that moves between the
lower floor, pierced with windows, and the upper
floor, blind and closed. Deleuze makes it more
complex, the fold in this construction runs be-
tween the mind and the body that can no longer
be figured in terms of oppositions. The philosophi-
cal use of concepts and their regulation through a
process of jurisprudence, is problematized, writes
Gregg Lambert. The cords translate visible and
audible movements from below into sounds up
above. But upper and lower floor are there for a
reason. I already mentioned that folding means
evolution, evolution into humans. When the hour
comes to unfold their parts to attain a degree of
organic development, proper to man, or to form
”cerebral folds“ as Deleuze writes, at the same
time their animal soul becomes reasonable. Life
here is implicated or enclosed with matter, know-
ledge is the discernment of the method by which
the soul is folded with an animal’s body. Very
much comparable with the paintings of Francis
Bacon where the distinction between animal and
human is blurred.16 “Discernment“ means for De-
leuze to be a ”cryptographer“, someone who can
at once account for nature and decipher the soul,
someone who can peer into the crannies of matter
and read into the folds of the soul. Cryptography is
the art of inventing the key to an enclosed thing.
In Leibniz becoming is an elevation: a change of
theater, of level or of floors. In other words, the
theater of matter gives way to that of spirits or of
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God. With Leibniz we notice three fundamental
notions: fluidity of matter, elasticity of bodies, and
a motivating spirit or God as mechanism.
For Deleuze Leibniz is the philosopher of the
Baroque. The experience of the Baroque entails
that of the fold. He is the first philosopher and
mathematician of the pleat, of curves and twisting
surfaces. ”Malerisch“ is the word Wölfflin used.
’Movement‘ alone is certainly not enough to de-
scribe the baroque. The baroque uses the ”Gewalt
des Affekts“, the ecstasy.17 In Baroque architecture
the severing of interior from the exterior is charac-
teristic. Wölfflin mentions the contrast between
the exacerbated language of the more closed faça-
de and the serene peace of the inside: a little cof-
fin containing the absolute as Jean Rousset writes.
It did not mean that the inside was quiet. It is the
enclosed world of the altar, the world of the
”splendori celesti“, as it was called, of heaven with
its clouds ands angels. Leibniz rethinks the pheno-
menon of the point of view, of perspective. As I
mentioned, Leibniz’ screen is under tension, has a
kind of elasticity or active force. The actions of the
screen consist in certain vibrations or oscillations,
like a cord under tension that is plucked and gives
off a tone or musical sound. The problem with this
concept as we know now, is that nerves are phy-
siologically distinct, a uniform cause like electrici-
ty, would generate different sensations from one
kind of nerve to another. Electricity applied to the
optic nerve (or cord, for that matter) produces the
experience of light, applied to the skin the sensati-
on of touch. Different inputs to the same nerve do
not produce different sensations – revealing a fun-
damentally arbitrary relation between stimulus and
sensory reception. The body posseses an inborn
ability to misperceive, unable to register semantic
input and, sensations can be interchangeable to
some extent. Designers and theorists have tended
to see the Deleuzean model as an invitation for a
rather literal folding of the envelope, a curving of
the skin that tends to ignore rather than privilege
the interior, Vidler writes. The Leibnizian fold
could in no way be replicated simply by the curved
surface of a tent-like or blob-like structure. This,
by the way is not the case in Lynn’s Animate Form,
his references to Leibniz are not very central to his
argument. 
Conclusion
Anthony Vidler referred to the new alliance bet-
ween spatial theory and ’biotectonics‘, utilizing
the potentials of digital modeling and drawing on
the observations of Deleuze and Cache, as a way
of sidestepping the traditional modernist and post-
modernist polarities of simplicity/complexity, har-
mony/opposition, and construction/deconstruc-
tion. Such ’reductive typologies‘ are replaced in
Greg Lynn’s practice by an open ended set of ma-
thematical/topological experiments that disturb if
not replace the formal paradigms of postmoder-
nism. Lynn’s forms are now ’proto-geometric‘, ’an-
exact‘, ’bloblike‘, ’viscous‘. Form is no longer con-
ceived of as a geometric ’original‘ distorted or
broken to incorporate complexity or represent
conflict, it is, says Vidler, a topological surface as if
organically generating new species in a speed up
of Darwinian evolution. Greg Lynn’s architecture
simulates organic analogies in information systems,
it mimics artificial nature. Lynn’s spatial morpholo-
gies are generated to offer potential evolution to
architecture. If the ”human“ is introduced as a for-
ce, Vidler writes, it is as movement – crowd or
swarm – and not as a generative instrument in it-
self, in other words we have finally lost all ground.
What gets lost here is corporeality in a threefold
way, three bodies are lost at the same time, the
territorial body of the planet and ecology, the so-
cial body or socius, and our human body. From
this results the need to reorient oneself, Virilio
writes, to reorient oneself with respect to the bo-
dy, to reorient one’s body with respect to the
other, but also with respect to the Earth, or the
world proper ... .18 In other words, we need to
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